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Abstract
Why not set up some public-service robot traders to counteract the behavior of traders when it snowballs into 
extreme moves? I show a blueprint of how this can be accomplished taking advantage of the theory of complex 
systems.
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My students and I have been suggesting a method for preventing 
bubbles and crashes in stock markets, other than using monetary policy 
and financial regulation, which may be ineffective anyway, as we argue 
[1]. The approach involves setting up a system of “robot traders.” By 
robots we mean “software-based traders,” which have been around 
for years but used for private gain. And they have sometimes been 
considered as culprits for extreme moves in markets. Some observers 
blame the first generation of robots for the crash of 1987 as they were 
the tools for delivering so-called “portfolio insurance.” Currently, 
programs are far more sophisticated and responsible for billions of 
dollars traded every day. We than asked: Why not set up some public-
service robot traders to counteract the mimetic behavior of traders 
when it snowballs into extreme moves? Why not create software-
based trading programs to take contrarian positions at key junctures 
in the movement of stock markets so as to keep them from diverting to 
extreme highs and lows? This proposal has received some scant media 
coverage so far [2]. 
How can this be accomplished? I will draft an explanation in the 
follow up, but let me first put that one has to accept as a fact of life that 
monetary policy and conventional regulation will necessarily fail. 
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan believed that 
bubbles are hard to detect, and that there was little need to respond 
to bubbles in any case since the Fed can always limit the damage 
after a bubble pops. Why take the chance of falsely identifying a 
bubble and slowing the economy unnecessarily when there is little 
cost to allowing bubbles to run their course? But Great Recessions 
can happen. And the Fed has evolved a little bit since the pre-bubble 
days of the Greenspan doctrine. After the subprime bubble, crash, 
and the Great Recession, Chairman Ben Bernanke acknowledged 
that the Fed should respond to signs of overheating in stock markets. 
But he prefers a targeted, regulatory-based approach rather than the 
use of conventional monetary policy through interest rate increases; 
the latter is, by the way, favored by Federal Reserve governor Jeremy 
Stein [3]. I share the concerns of Bernanke on this, and tell you why. 
Monetary policy is a poor tool crafted for use in a simplistic model 
world, not the complex financial world we live in. In today’s high-tech 
age, one naturally assumes that policymakers are using sophisticated 
quantitative computer models to guide monetary policy, but they 
are not. The best models they have are of two types [4]. The first is 
econometric: empirical statistical models that are fitted to past data. 
These successfully forecast a few quarters ahead as long as things 
do not change, but fail in the face of big changes. The second type is 
known as DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models. 
These models by their very nature rule out crises, and thus are also a 
poor tool to tackle big changes. But there are alternatives that suit the 
complexity of the matter; these are the class of “agent-based models.” 
So to summarize, monetary policy is a tool not designed to our complex 
financial world. One has to move on to an upper level and embrace the 
superior approach of agent-based models. Unfortunately, mainstream 
economists and policymakers for that matter are not prepared—and 
some are even hostile—to acknowledge that financial markets are 
complex systems. This sounds “too specialized” and “too scientific” for 
the average economist’s mindset. 
Conventional financial regulation is also hopeless. Experience from 
the recent crisis suggests it is in the nature of markets that they will 
tend to innovate around regulations, and the nature of risk taking will 
inevitably keep changing as financial systems get more sophisticated 
[5]. Regulatory frameworks have to adapt to circumstances that 
are changing too fast for regulation to succeed, and the robots have 
something to do with this. The recent episodes of “flash crashes” 
provide an example. Thanks to the flash crash of May 6th when the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average plunged by nearly 1,000 points in a matter of 
minutes, the merits of high-frequency trading are under scrutiny by 
regulators, in particular the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
flash crash report [6] identified that …on May 6, when markets were 
already under stress, the sell algorithm chosen by the large trader to 
only target trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed the 
sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes. At a later date, the 
large fundamental trader executed trades over the course of more than 
6 hours to offset the net short position accumulated on May 6. 
The report then concluded that…one key lesson is that under 
stressed market conditions, the automated execution of a large sell 
order can trigger extreme price movements, especially if the automated 
execution algorithm does not take prices into account. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission then suggested a market-
wide system of “circuit breakers,” which would require all exchanges to 
stop or slow down trading for a few minutes if the market experiences 
a certain rate of decline. I call your attention for the fact that the SEC 
does not aim to act pre-emptively, but only to react in the aftermath. 
It is no surprise then that “mini-flash crashes” in individual stocks 
have been left unchecked since the flash crash of the DJIA. Stocks that 
experienced rapidly plunges then rebounds on particular days in 2011 
and 2012 were Abott Labs, Apple, Cisco Systems, City Group, Core 
Molding, Enstar, Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Micron, Progress Energy, 
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Pfeizer, Pall Corporation, RLJ Equity Partners, Thermo Fischer Co., 
and Washington Post. Stock exchanges do not publicly release data 
about these mini crashes, but most active traders say there are currently 
at least a dozen a day [7]. In summary, apparently financial regulation 
in its current format is not working. 
Bak and Paczuski remarkably observed [8] that in complex systems, 
large, catastrophic events occur as a consequence of the same dynamics 
that produces small, ordinary events. This statement runs counter to 
the usual way of thinking about large events. But large dynamic systems 
naturally evolve, or self organize, into a highly interactive, critical state 
where a minor perturbation may lead to events of all sizes. Such actual 
events cannot be predicted, but the statistical distribution of these events 
is predictable. As stock markets are viewed as complex systems, the 
trigger of a crash cannot be synonymous with its cause. A confluence of 
factors rather than a particular trigger is the proper explanation. Take 
the trigger of the flash crash, which the SEC identified as the sell order 
of the mutualfund group Waddel & Reed, which started to sell $4.1 
billion of “E-Mini” futures contracts through robot trading. According 
to the SEC, this ignited the crisis because the markets were already 
“under stress.” I have to add for the sake of precision that the DJIA had 
to be in a critical state on May 6 for such a sell order to trigger the flash 
crash. Otherwise, the crisis would ever get started.
In fact, the flash crash of the DJIA shows the footprints of a 
complex system at work; I have witnessed this in a study with another 
couple of students [9]. And with a colleague we went further [10]. 
Thanks to increasing high-frequency trading, correlations previously 
only seen across hours or days in trading time-series are now possibly 
showing up in timescales of minutes or seconds [11]. As it happens, 
the buildup of correlations brought by high-frequency trading may 
shape the nature of flash crashes and these may emerge as “log-periodic 
phenomena.” This means that after a critical time a crash may suddenly 
occur without any early warning signs.
Despite the fact that financial regulation cannot succeed using 
the currently widely used conventional tools, in theory one can still 
rely on the control theory of self organized systems [8]. This approach 
has been applied to a number of complex systems, including the 
attempts to influence the group behavior of cockroach aggregation in 
shelters. Engineers have devised autonomous cockroach-robots and 
relied on self organization as the main coordination mechanism. The 
controller of individual robots was designed using reactive, behavior-
based techniques. Socially integrated autonomous robots, perceived 
as conspecifics by the group of cockroaches and acting as interactive 
decoys, were able to control their self-organized group choices of shelter. 
Inspired by this, my students and I then suggested the use of socially 
integrated robot traders in stock markets to function as an anti-bubble 
decoy [1]. We borrowed from such models of cockroaches finding 
a shelter but also from those of information transfer in fish shoals, 
and applied their modeling principles to the stock market. Our basic 
framework was a type of agent-based model named “stochastic cellular 
automata model.” The model was able to generate an emergent stock 
price dynamics as a result of the interaction between traders. We then 
replicated the characteristics of actual stock markets with their price 
dynamics of highs and lows. In the presence of extreme events, these 
cannot be accommodated with a Gaussian probability distribution. 
Variances in the real financial world are too high for Gaussian 
standards. But we were lucky enough to realize that after introducing 
socially integrated contrarian robots, the stock price dynamics could be 
controlled, so as to make the market more Gaussian. This plainly means 
the bubbles and crashes disappeared. So we think this blueprint for 
market stability, if correctly engineered, may offer a credible alternative 
to monetary policy and current financial regulation. And while 
monetary policy and standard financial regulation are conspicuous, an 
extra advantage of contrarian algorithms is their crypticness. 
We are not selling the final recipe for preventing financial crashes; 
rather, we are suggesting the ingredients and the type of cake. How 
to pay for the costs of the contrarian robot-trading system still needs 
refining. One implicit implication of our analysis [1] was that 20 
percent of the total market turnover would give the necessary resources, 
because we found that 20 percent of robots were enough for stabilizing. 
Obviously, this is too expensive for the taxpayer. And this will render 
the approach unfeasible in practice, unless the robots are adjusted to 
make money as well, in which case the contrarian algorithms will be 
self-financing. An extra difficulty is that the human investors will likely 
react to the counter-measures. To circumvent this barrier, research 
will have to appeal to the insights provided by biological studies of 
evolutionary arms race. The regulatory robots would take advantage 
for acting first, but should be prepared to react differently in light of 
possible disclosures by investors who decode the running algorithm 
and attempt to exploit it. Anyway, any artificial-market model like ours 
can capture some key characteristics of actual markets but inevitably 
may neglect others, thanks to the very nature of modeling. Thus, the 
line of research launched by our approach still needs further model 
distilling. And as more and more robust estimation are produced we 
will end up with the ultimate recipe for practical use. 
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